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PREFACE 
 
The title of this thesis is “EARNINGS MANAGEMENT:A 
LITERATURE REVIEW” to fulfill some part of the requirements for achieving 
the Bachelor of Economics in the Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana Salatiga. 
This thesis aimed to explore and discuss literature on earnings management 
based on the previous studies. This study was a literature study which aimed to 
obtain an understanding on the concept  of earnings management for the accounting 
body of research. Moreover, this study is expected to have a contribution from any 
related parties. For the practical benefit, this research prospected as a reference for 
people to know about earnings management. For thetheoretical benefit, this 
research is prospected as a contribution to science and as a reference for the next 
study with a similar topic in the future. 
The author realizes that this thesis has many inadequacy and limitations. 
Therefore, the author expects suggestions and criticisms that can build in order to 
improve this thesis. To all those who have helped in writing this thesis, the end of 
the author says thank you and may God bless us all.  
 
  
 
Salatiga, April 25, 2017 
 
 
The author 
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Abstract 
This study aims to provide a map of variables related earnings management 
as an dependent variable and an independent variable based on previous study to 
give consistency on the earnings management research. This study utilized  
purposive sampling method during the 1992 – 2013 period on Google Scholar, 
followed by a review of 30 previous studies concerning earnings management. 
There are 20 previous studies were considered earnings management as an afected 
variable. There are three categories in accounting theory which is believed to 
influence earnings management related to Positive Accounting Theory (PAT), 
corporate governance, accounting standards. Based on the discussion, when 
earnings management was considered as dependent variable, most of the previous 
study relating with variable that arises due to corporate governance. There are 10 
previous studies were considered earnings management as an affecting variable. 
There are four categories in accounting theory which is believed to be influenced 
by earnings management related to Positive Accounting Theory (PAT), financial 
activity, firm performance and corporate governance. Then when earnings 
management was considered as an independent variable, most of the previous study 
relating variable that arise due to financial indicator measurement in firm 
performance. In general, this study concluded that earnings management which 
considered as a dependent variable or an independent, both of side, must be 
relationship with variable that arises due to corporate governance and Positive 
Accounting Theory (PAT). 
Keywords : earnings management,literature review 
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Saripati 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk memberikan peta variabel terkait manajemen 
laba sebagai variabel dependen dan variabel independen berdasarkan penelitian 
terdahulu untuk memberikan konsistensi pada penelitian manajemen laba. 
Penelitian ini menggunakan metode purposive sampling selama periode 1992 - 
2013 di Google Scholar, dilanjutkan dengan peninjauan 30 studi sebelumnya 
mengenai manajemen laba. Ada 20 penelitian sebelumnya yang menganggap 
manajemen laba sebagai variabel yang terpengaruh. Ada tiga kategori dalam teori 
akuntansi yang diyakini mempengaruhi manajemen laba terkait dengan Positive 
Accounting Theory (PAT), corporate governance, standar akuntansi. Berdasarkan 
pembahasan, ketika manajemen laba dianggap sebagai variabel dependen, 
sebagian besar penelitian terdahulu berkaitan dengan variabel yang timbul karena 
tata kelola perusahaan. Ada 10 penelitian sebelumnya yang dianggap manajemen 
laba sebagai variabel yang mempengaruhi. Ada empat kategori dalam teori 
akuntansi yang diyakini dipengaruhi oleh manajemen laba terkait dengan Teori 
Akuntansi Positif (PAT), aktivitas keuangan, kinerja perusahaan dan tata kelola 
perusahaan. Kemudian ketika manajemen laba dianggap sebagai variabel 
independen, sebagian besar penelitian terdahulu menhubungkan variabel yang 
timbul karena pengukuran indikator keuangan pada kinerja perusahaan. Secara 
umum, penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa manajemen laba yang dianggap 
sebagai variabel dependen atau independen, keduanya, pasti memiliki hubungan 
dengan variabel yang timbul karena tata kelola perusahaan dan Teori Akuntansi 
Positif (PAT). 
 
Keywords : earnings management,literature review 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, in making investment decisions, investors need companies’ 
information in the form of financial statement as a tool to determine  the 
performance of companies over a given period. Information presented in financial 
statements includes the statement of financial position, the statement changes in 
equity, the cash flow and the notes to financial statements (Fairfield, 1996). 
Although all of the information on the financial statements  are important, users 
generally use profit as a parameter to measure the company performance. In this 
situation, management of a company knows the importance of profit to influence  
investors’ decisions.  Therefore, the possibility that management might take a 
dysfunctional behavior actions, such as earnings management, could raise concern. 
Earnings management  is a condition when managers use their interventions in 
preparing financial statements such as flatten, raise and lower earnings 
(Schipper,1989). According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), they viewed that earnings 
management happen when management uses certain decisions in preparing and 
reporting financial statements by changing the transaction. It is intended to mislead 
the stakeholders about the company economic condition. Furthermore, it will affect 
the contractual control of the reported accounting figures, and it will be 
advantageous for the management on the investor decision. 
According to Scott (1997) earnings management  includes two parts: 
earnings management as amanager opportunistic behavior to maximize his utility 
on the compensation contracts, debt contracts and political cost (opportunistic 
earnings management) and earnings management was viewed as a perspective of 
efficient contracting (efficient earnings management) that gives manager flexibility 
in protecting the company. Based on these two perspectives, it can be concluded 
that earnings management does not always contain the downside because it is legal 
by the accounting standard and make benefit for the company to protect themselves 
during a given period. The scandal of earnings management mostly is about 
accounting financial reporting by corporations such as Enron,Merck,WorldCom 
and other enterprises in the Unites Stated (Cornett,2006). Indonesia ranks 15 out of 
31 countries during the1990-1999 period based on International comparative 
research on earnings management (Leuz et al. 2003). Those study explained that 
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Indonesia was on the average rate of earnings management practices. In Indonesia, 
earnings management practices occurred in some companies such as PTLippo Tbk 
by manipulating financial reporting  and  PT Kimia Farma Tbk by presenting 
overstated net income over Rp.28,870 billion. The previous study associated 
earnings management with some variable such as corporate governancethat will 
affect earnings management in the banking sector (Nasution and Setiawan,2007), 
then another research associate managerial ownership, company size and corporate 
governance with earnings management practices (Anggareni 2013). The previous 
research also discussed earnings management to be associated with political cost, 
debt contract amd firm performance. It can be concluded that earnings management 
was interesting to study cause this behaviour has effect to another variable or this 
behaviour was arise due anoter variable. Furthermore, as we know based on 
previous study that earnings managementis related with some of the variables, and 
it is interesting to learn the  diversity of the previous study to improve the 
understanding of earnings management. This study aims to provide a  map of 
variables  related earning management as an dependent variable and an independent 
variable based on previous study to give consistency on the earnings management 
researc. This study contribute to improve the understanding of earnings 
management for accounting scholar. This study compares previous studies on 
earnings management using purposive sampling method.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Definition of Earnings Management 
According to the Healy & Wahlen (1999) revealed that the managers use 
their judgment in reporting and structuring the financial transaction to adjust and 
mislead the users. This action is defined as earnings management behavior in 
purpose to deceive a stakeholder about their company economic performance. By 
doing distortion of company financial reporting,  themanager actually wants to fool 
the investor about their performance.  As a result, lower earnings management 
describes thehigher quality of financial reporting and agreater level of earnings 
management describes thelower quality of financial reporting. According to Cornet 
et al. (2008), earnings management is defined as an anticipation step to face a loan 
3 
 
agreement, reduce the regulatory cost and increasing  the regulatory benefit on 
financial reporting. It simply explains that manager who did earnings management 
tend to obtaina benefit for themselves. Schipper (1989) revealed earnings 
management as a distortion action in the sense ofsecuring some private gain.  In 
contrast, Fischer (1994) stated that earnings management includes of manager 
actions are intended  to increase or decrease current reported earnings, and they do 
not have responsible for generating a corresponding increase or decrease in the 
long-term economic profitability of the company. Briefly summarized, it can be 
concluded that earnings management is included in one of the factors that can 
reduce the credibility of the financial statements and may interfere the users to 
believe these numbers are real results. 
 
B. Earnings Management Approach 
An extensive literature identifies earnings management approach through 
discretionary accruals and hypothesized explanatory accruals based on the relation 
between total accruals and hypothesized explanatory accruals. McNichols(2000) 
revealed that there are three approaches that can be used to measure earnings 
management; (1) based on the continuous from accrual specific model done by 
Healy (1985), Jones model and modified Jones,  (2) based on the continuous from 
accruals specific model done by Beneish (1997) and Skinner (1999), and  (3) based 
on frequency, the focus was on the behavior of profit associated with specific 
benchmarks which earnings management practices can be seen from the number of 
companies reporting earnings frequencies above or below the benchmark (Myers 
and Skinner 1999).  
 
C. Measurement of Earnings Management 
Earnings management practices can be detected by  measuring total 
accruals. Total accruals are the differences between earnings and cash flow from 
the operation activity. Accrual is the main component to form the profit an arranged 
accruals by the estimation or judgment. Richardson (2006) found that accruals are 
related to earnings manipulation, practices can be detected by the measurement of 
total accruals, which differentiate between profit and cash flows from operating 
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activities. Accrual changes the occurrence to be regarded as abnormal. This change 
is the result of excessive use of discretion policy used by management. In the same 
time, management also has an incentive/motive to manipulate earnings accrual then 
the changes is considered as a form of earnings manipulation by management.  
Normal or Non-discretionary Accruals 
According to Wijaya and Martani (2011),  accruals are naturally present in 
the process of preparing the financial statements, which includes normal and 
nondiscretionary accruals.The normal accruals arepreordained to capture 
adjustments that reflect basic performance. Nondiscretionary accruals are 
components that happen along with the changes of the company activities. Jones 
model (1991), modified by Guenther (1994) assumed that during the absence of 
earnings management, accruals nondiscretionary was a function of the sales 
changes.  
Abnormal or Discretionary accruals 
 Discretionary accruals are derived from the accrual component of earnings 
management. Discretionary accruals could not be observed directly from the 
financial statements, so it needs to be estimated through be some models. When a 
model forms expectations on the level of non-discretionary accruals and the sum of 
the deviations observed in actual, it is assumed as accrual non-discretionary. 
Therefore, it is viewed as accrued through the model used. The discretionary accrual 
calculation is done by applying Jones model (1991), which has been modified by 
Guenther (1994).  
 
D. Aspect on Earnings Management  
The purpose of earnings management practices is to gain benefit for a 
company. Earnings management is also an anticipatory step to avoid a situation 
such as a loan agreement, reducing the regulatory cost, and increasing the regulatory 
benefit (Cornett et al., 2008). The benefit is associated with the management’s 
efforts in regulating certain incomes or profits for certain purposes that are directly 
or indirectly related to the company’s profit. According to the Schipper (1989), 
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earnings management  is the disclosure of management  intervention to obtain some 
private gain. Similarly, Ayres (1994) suggested that earnings management is an 
intentional structuring reportingto alter reported income that would not occur unless 
management was concerned with the financial reporting implications. Accordingly, 
it can be concluded that earnings management has two interrelated aspects. First, it 
misplaces company’s possible resources to lead extra costs for the company. 
Second, earnings management can become a positive factor when the management 
is able to utilize it for the company’s benefit. Response and Fischer (1994) stated 
that earnings management consists of theintended manager action to increase 
(decrease) current reported earnings of the unit for which the manager is responsible 
without generating a corresponding increase (decrease) in the long-term economic 
profitability of the unit. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
A.  Data 
 This study is prepared using literature study approach, which means the data 
is from the publication of previous studies. The Information obtained, compared, 
either contradictory or mutually reinforcing was discussed critically according to 
the level of the understanding. The purpose of this qualitative study was to find out 
the empirical reality about the concept of earnings management  behind the 
phenomenon in depth, detailed and complete.Sekaran (2006) suggested that a study 
needs the minimum sample to consist of 30 samples. Thereby, in this study, the 
samples consist of 30 previous studies used earnings management as one of the 
dependent or independent variable. This study focused on previous research with 
thestudy presented in english language. The process for selecting the study is based 
on the subjectivity of study that can be accessed openly on Google Scholar. 
However, local Indonesian context would also be included when it was recognized 
as an english language. The sample will be taken studies  published on Google 
Scholar during 1991 – 2013 period. This period is particularly based on the most 
available studies about earnings management during 1991-2013 in Google Scholar, 
that is considered not only to capture  along financial crisis period, but also there 
were so many studies investigated about earnings management during that time. 
This study uses the non-probability sampling technique and purposive sampling 
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method to meet the following criteria: (1) The study taken as thesample has earnings 
management as one of the dependent or an independent variable. (2) The study 
taken as sample need to be in English langauge study published in Google scholar. 
B. Analysis  
Data analysis is the step of systematically looking for and organizing data 
obtained from  field notes, and other materials (Sekaran, 2006). The analysis of the 
data was based on the following steps below:  
1. Collecting research samples uses earnings management as a keyword on 
Google Scholar during the 1993-2013 period.  
2. Eliminating samples, using purposive sampling method. The samples meet the 
following criteria: (1) the study needs to consider earnings management as one 
of the dependent or independent variable. (2) The study needs to be in 
aprevious study published in Google Scholar inthe English language during the 
1993-2013 period. 
3. Make a table to gain information about the main point of each study. (Title, 
Author, Purpose , Published year, Sourced/Origin Country, Independent 
Variable, Dependent Variable, Sample, Method ,Findings, Keyword) 
4. Differentiating the sample based on the two categories, which considering 
earnings management as a dependent variable or an independent variable. 
5. Reading the study to get themain point in several ways: (1) Firstly, reading the 
whole of the study to know about the study purposes and position of earnings 
management as a variable inthe study. (2) Secondly, understanding the used 
method on the study. (3) Lastly, making theconclusion of each study. 
6. Develop a table to plot related variable on a study. 
7. Grouping variables in several categories  
8. Drawing the conceptual framework for earnings management as a dependent 
variable and as an independent variable. 
9. Discussing the results based on the classification. 
FINDINGS 
This study aims to providing a  map of variables  related earning 
management as an dependent variable and an independent variable based on 
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previous study to give consistency on the earnings management research. This 
study contributes to improve the understanding of earnings management for 
accounting scholar. A study usually has two variable or more to be associated, the 
one is a dependent variable or affected variable  and an independent variable or 
affecting variable.In this study, earnings management were classified based on the 
two types, earnings management which considered as a dependent variableand as 
an independent variable to determine what variables related to this study. After 
exploring the variables that associated with earnings management in studies, then 
the variables are grouped into several categories accounting theories. Earnings 
management were considered as a dependent variable when this behaviour arise 
due other variable, in another words the existence of earnings management is 
caused by another variable. Then earnings management were considered as an 
independent variable when it has an effect to another variable, so this behaviour 
affect another variable. Then this discussion will present when earnings 
management as a dependent variable or an independent variable, there are some 
variable to be related to affect or affected. The discussion presented findings and 
provide facts  related to earnings management as a variable in  an empirical study. 
Table 1. Summary of Studies 
No Author Year Dependent Variable Independent Variable 
1. Key 1997 Earnings management Political cost incentives 
2. Pourciau 1992 Earnings management Nonroutine  executive 
changes 
3. Chtourou, 
Bedard, and 
Courteau 
2001 Earnings management Corporate Governance 
4. Klein 2002 Earnings management Audit committee and board 
of director characteristics 
5. Peasnell, Pope 
and Young 
2000 Earnings management Board Effectiveness 
6. Cornett, McNutt 
and Thehranian 
2009 Earnings management Corporate governance 
 
7. Nugroho and Eko 2010 Earnings management Board characteristics 
8. Murhadi 2009 Earnings management Good Corporate Governance 
 
Table 1. (continue) 
9. Carcello, 
Hollingsworth 
and Klein 
2006 Earnings management Audit Committee Financial 
Expertise, Competing 
Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms 
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10. Alzoubi and 
Selamat 
2012 Earnings management The Effectiveness of 
Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms 
11. Liu and Lul 2007 Earnings management Corporate Governance 
12. Swastika 2013 Earnings management Corporate Governance, Firm 
Size, 
 
13. Shen, and Chih 2007 Earnings management Corporate Governance 
14. Cornetta, 
Marcusb, and 
Tehraninanb 
2007 Earnings management Corporate governance and 
pay-for-performance 
 
15. Ghoncharov and 
Zimmermann 
2009 Earnings management Accounting Standards 
16. Jeanjean and 
Stowlowy 
2008 Earnings management The mandatory introduction 
of IFRS standards 
17. Chai, Rahman 
and Courtenay 
2008 Earnings management IFRS Enforcement 
18. Patricia, Sloan, 
and Sweeney 
1995 Earnings management Models  for detecting 
earnings management 
19. McNichols 1991 Earnings management Research design issues 
20. Teoh, Welch, and 
Wong 
1997 Earnings management The underperformance of 
seasoned equity offerings 
21. Bergstressera and 
Phillopon 
2004 CEO incentives Earnings management 
22. Perrya and 
Williams 
1984 Management buyout 
offers 
Earnings management 
23. Haider 2002 Dividend Policy Earnings management 
24. Cohen and 
Zarowin 
1979 Seasoned equity 
offerings 
Earnings management 
25. Roychowdhury 2006 Real activities 
manipulation 
Earnings management 
26. Gill, Biger, and 
Mathur 
2013 Return on Assets 
(Firm Performance) 
Earnings management 
27. Gunny 2005 Future operating 
performance 
Earnings management 
28. Burgstahler and 
Dichev 
1997 Earnings decreases 
and losses 
Earnings management 
29. Kazmik 1996 Voluntary Disclosure 
 
Earnings management 
30. Leuz, Nanda, and 
Wyscoki 
2003 Investor protection 
 
Earnings management 
Source: Google Scholar 
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A. Earnings Management Was Considered as A Dependent Variable 
 This section discusses earnings management presented as a dependent 
variable or as an affected variable in an empirical study. Based on the 30 previous 
international studies, 20 studies  investigated earnings management as  the 
dependent variable.  Figure 1 describes variables associated with earnings 
management.There are three categories in accounting theory which is believed to  
influence  earnings management.  Studies in this group of papers are categorized as 
related to Positive Accounting Theory (PAT), corporate governance, accounting 
standards, and there are three study that exclude from the theories and categorized 
as other variables which affected earnings management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework of affecting variable on earnings management  
Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) 
 According to the Watt & Zimmerman (1986), the aim of accounting theory 
is to explain and predict accounting practices. The explanation should  describe the 
reason why a practice happens, and the prediction should be able to predict 
accounting practices phenomenon in the future.  Further,  Watt & Zimmerman 
(1986) formulated three hypothesis in an opportunistic form which consists: Plan 
bonus hypothesis, debt convenient hypothesis, and politic cost hypothesis. Based 
on that hypothesis, Anis dan Imam (2003) concluded that Positive Accounting 
Theory (PAT)  recognized the relationship between management and the owner. In 
here politic cost hypothesis, explaining that large scale company tends to lower their 
profit to reduce the degree of visibility, is associated with earnings management. 
This concept was suitable with  data in Appendix 1, Key (1997) revealed that 
Positive Accounting 
Theory (PAT) 
Corporate Governance 
 
Accounting standard  
Other variables 
Earnings 
manageme
nt 
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political cost negatively related to earnings management in the cable television 
industry during periods of Congressional scrutiny. Earnings management was 
measured using discretionary accruals by Jones model 1991, and the result showed 
that managers attempt to mitigate earnings by reducing net income. Another 
association arises suitable with plan bonus hypothesis, explaining selected method 
by the manager to maximize their profit, affects earnings management.In Appendix 
2, Pourciau (1992) revealed that  incoming executive tends to do earnings 
management by decreasing earnings in the year of the executive change and 
increasing earnings in the following year. By using random walk model, the result 
showed that incoming executives manage did earnings management when the 
turnover of the structure position in routine or non-routine executive changed on a 
company. In simply, earnings management was negatively affected by the affecting 
variable arise due Positive Accounting Theory (PAT). 
Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance, arising as the impact of three hypothesis in the 
Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) that believed to change manager action in 
preparing financial reporting, was believed as the controller to supervise managers 
activity to protect the owner. Corporate governance is the process to increase the 
success of the business and corporate accountability in order to realize the value 
stakeholder capital. Sample proved that most of theinvestigated previous study 
consider the effect of corporate governance as affecting variable on earnings 
management. In Appendix 3, Chtourou, Bedard, and Courteau (2001) investigated 
whether a company with corporate governance practices has an effect on the quality 
of publicly released financial information. In this research, earnings management, 
measured on discretionary accruals using a cross-sectional version of the Jones 
1991 model, was negatively associated with corporate governance component 
member including audit committee and boards of directors. In another word, this 
research made a statement that a larger proportion of outside member audit 
committee and board of directors whose have experience with other firm did 
earnings management. Similarly, Klein (2002) in Appendix 4 examined whether 
corporate governance on the term audit committee and board characteristics related 
to earnings management. Using a cross-sectional Jones regression model to 
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measure discretionary accruals, the finding showed that independence boards and 
theaudit committee have anegative relation to earnings management. In addition, 
the evidence found that reductions in board or audit committee independence are 
accompanied by substantial increases in abnormal accruals. Another study in 
Appendix 5, using modified Jones model, Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000) stated 
that board directors met earnings management to avoid earnings losses on the pre- 
and post-Cadbury periods. Further, in Appendix 6, Cornett, McNutt and Thehranian 
(2009) revealed that earnings, board independence, and capital are negatively 
related to earnings management. Using fixed-effect OLS regression method, the 
finding showed that corporate governance and earnings management are constantly 
associated.  
For a local context, in Appendix 7, Nugroho and Eko (2010) reviewed the 
effect of corporate governance on the term of board characteristics on earnings 
management in companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange during 2004-
2008. Using Jones model(1991) to measure earnings management, It is discovered 
that dual leadership/CEO duality have negatively affect earnings management. That 
study is supported by another study in appendix 8, Murhadi (2009) found out only 
two variables on corporate governance that have asignificant effect on earnings 
management  which is CEO Duality and controlling shareholder existence.  
Contrast with theprevious study, on appendix 9, Carcello, Hollingsworth 
and Klein (2006), Appendix 9, stated that there was a positive association between 
financial expertise to mitigate earnings management. By using the modified jones 
model with discretionary accruals, the result showed that the independent audit 
committee members with financial expertise are most effective in mitigating 
earnings management. Alzoubi and Selamat (2012), Appendix 10, using 
thequalitative method, stated that the company with striking characteristics of board 
directors (more members, individualindependence, and more financial expertise) 
and audit committee (smaller in size, have more independent directors, meet more 
frequently) have less possibility  to do earnings management. Liu and Lul (2007), 
Appendix 11, discussed earnings management as a dependent variable influenced 
by corporate governance on the Chinese listed company during 1999 – 2005 period. 
By introducing tunneling perspective, the results showed that higher corporate 
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governance levels have alower level of earnings management. Using Jones model 
1991, the findings explained that corporate governance on tunneling has negatively 
affect earnings management practices. Swastika (2013), Appendix 12, examined 
the impact of corporate governance (board of director, audit quality, and board 
independence corporate performance (firm size) on the earnings management. By 
using the multiple regression and Jones model with discretionary accruals to 
measure earnings management, the results showed that companies with  good 
governance were positively associated with earnings management.  In line with 
Swastika, Shen, and Chih (2007), Appendix 13, revealed that companies with good 
corporate governance tend to conduct fewer earnings management. They stated the 
corporate governance could mitigate the effect of earnings management such a size 
effect, leverage effect and reverse effect. Finally, Cornetta, Marcusb, and 
Tehraninanb (2007), Appendix 14, revealed that institutional ownership of shares 
could decrease the level of earnings management practices. By using modified 
Jones model, the finding showed that the presence impact of board directors and 
independent outside director could reduce earnings management.  
 In conclusion, there were 12 studies regarded corporate governance as 
affecting variable due to earnings management. Then, it can be concluded that the 
presence impact of theaudit committee, boards of directors, independence boards, 
dual leadership/CEO on corporate governance negatively affect earnings 
management. However, samples found that the presence impact of financial 
expertise and the effective characteristics of corporate governance can mitigate 
earnings management. Therefore, it can be concluded that earnings management 
was affected by the affecting variable arise due to corporate governance. Corporate 
governancehasboth negative and positive association with earnings management, 
as theindependent variable.  
Accounting Standards 
Ghoncharoyand Zimmerman (2009), accounting standards provide different 
accounting choices to result in thedifferent quality of earnings. Companies have 
choices of accounting method based on accounting standards. Ghoncharov and 
Zimmermann (2009), Appendix 15, stated that selected accounting standards, using 
German GAAP, IAS, or US GAAP, will result in adifferent level of earnings 
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management. This finding showed that accounting standards have role play on the 
earnings management.Furthermore, using Jones model 1991, Jeanjean and 
Stowlowy (2008), Appendix 16, revealed that the existence of IFRS does not give 
positive effect to earnings management. She stated that earnings management 
increased after the introduction of IFRS in France. These findings show that 
accounting standards do not positively affect earnings management. Then in 
contrast, by using regression method Jones model 1991, Chai, Rahman and 
Courtenay (2008), in appendix 17, stated that IFRS positively affect earnings 
management proved with decreasing number of earnings management by IFRS-
adopting countries. Based on that sample, it can be concluded that selected 
accounting standards does not always negatively affect earnings management. The 
other fact proved that IFRS could positively mitigate earnings management 
practices. 
 
Other Variables 
Although, earnings management was affected by the three variables above,  
in fact, another variable that is not related to the above three theories also affects 
earnings management. Patricia, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), Appendix 18, 
investigated  association model for detecting earnings management. By comparing 
discretionary accruals, he stated that earnings management model has negatively 
affected to earnings management. Further, McNichols (2000), Appendix 19, by 
using Jones model, stated that research design used in earnings management 
negatively associated with earnings management. Using Jones model 1991, Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong (1997), Appendix 20, revealed that underperformed seasoned 
equity offerings negatively related to earnings management. Especially, it happened 
when earnings management occurred prior toan offering year, peaked in the 
offering year and declined thereafter. Based on the followed discussion, it can be 
concluded the selected earnings management method, earnings management 
research design and underperformed seasoned equity positively affect earnings 
management.  
 
B. Earnings Management An Independent Variable 
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This section discusses earnings management as an independent variable to 
affect other variables. From 30 studies, 10 studies were considered earnings 
management as an independent variable. Accordingly, the variables are grouped 
based the several categories  which  describe in Figure 2. There are four categories 
of accounting theory which believed to impact affected variable on earnings 
management. Positive Accounting Theory (PAT), financial activity, firm 
performance and corporate governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual framework of affected variable on earnings management  
 
 
Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) 
Different with the previous discussion, in here earnings management as an 
affecting variable was believed to affect a variable that arise due existence of 
positive Accounting Theory (PAT). Although earnings management can be both if 
side as a dependent and as an independent variable, Positive Acoounting Theory 
(PAT) was believed as the theory that has strong relationship with earnings 
management.According to Watt & Zimmerman (1986), bonus plan hypothesis 
theory, one of three hypothesis theory on Positive Accounting Theory, explained 
that  managers tend to choose accounting method that will let them arrange their 
earnings to maximize their bonus. This theory is suitable with the finding  in 
appendix 21, Bergstressera and Phillopon (2004), stated that earnings management 
Positive Accounting Theory 
(PAT) 
 
Financial Activity 
 
Firm Performance 
 
Corporate Governance  
 
E a r n i n g s 
Management 
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give impact to the CEO’s potential total compensation practices. This finding 
indicated that managers tend to do earnings management to raise their bonus. The 
previous discussion is relating earnings management as dependent variable, the 
difference in here earnings management as an independent variable  
 
Financial Activity   
Financial activity  is any transactions or initiatives undertaken by a business 
to further the fulfillment of economic goals. Financial activities  might include 
buying and selling of products or assets, organizing and maintaining accounts, 
issuing stocks or bonds, arranging loans, or other business activities with specific 
commercial objectives. Financial activities involve long-term liabilities, 
stockholders' equity (or owner's equity), and changes to short-term borrowings. 
Based on the sample earnings management affect financial activities on the term 
financing and investing activities. Using Jones model, Perrya and Williams (1994), 
Appendix 22, revealed that earnings management negatively impact management 
participated (or bid to participate) in the buyout of going-private companies. Haider 
(2012), Appendix 23, examined whether is there any impact of earnings 
management on dividend policy in Pakistan. By using modified cross-sectional 
model (1995) to measure discretionary accruals, he found that there was no 
relationship between earnings management and dividend policy. This study 
reported that earnings management does not affect dividend policy. Based on the 
sample, it can be concluded that earnings management affect financing activity, but 
earnings management does not affect investing activity. 
 
Firm Performance 
According to Daft (2010), firm performance is the ability of thevaluable 
company to achieve its goals by using resources efficiently and effectively. Firm 
performance can be measured using two indicators of financial and non-financial 
(Rasula,Vuksic, and Stemberger, 2012). Based on the explanation, it can be said 
that every company tends to display good financial and non-financial performance. 
Earnings management is considered to affect dependent variables that arise due 
tofinancial indicator measurement in firm performance.Cohen and Zarowin (2010), 
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Appendix 24, by using the Heckman (1979) method, stated that earnings 
management affects on the company's choices of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) 
operating underperforming.Roychowdhury (2006), Appendix 25, said that earnings 
management has animpact on the real activity manipulation. By using Cross-
sectional regression method, the finding showed that managers did earnings 
management through manipulating real activities to avoid reporting annual losses. 
Further, Gill, Biger, and Mathur (2013), Appendix 26, by using a co-relational 
research design, stated that earnings management has aneffect on thecorporate rate 
of return on assets in the following year. They found that  more intense the practice 
of earnings management, the greater it’s adverse effect on thecorporate rate of 
return on assets in next year. Gunny (2005), Appendix 27, stated that earnings 
management has anegative effect on company future operating performance. By 
using modified Jones model, this finding revealed that the managers could do 
earnings management by recognizing the future earnings implications of the 
investment in SG&A and cutting prices and/or overproducing to increase current 
period income. Finally, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Appendix 28, stated that 
earnings management affect the company to manage reported earnings to avoid 
decreases and losses.  Based on the sample, it can be concluded that earnings 
management influences dependent variables that arise due tofinancial indicator 
measurement in firm performance. 
 
Corporate Governance  
Different with the previous discussion, the fourth category is associating 
earnings management as an independent variable to affect corporate governance. 
Earnings management is discussed in relation to the principle of Good Corporate 
Governance that had been  recommended  by Komite Nasional Kebijakan Corporate 
Governance (KNKCG) on 1999. The principle consists Transparency, 
Accountability, Responsibility, Independency and Fairness (TARIF) as a tool to 
apply Good Corporate Governance (GCG). Consistent with corporate governance 
principles on the term of transparency.Kazmik (1996), Appendix 29, examined the 
role of accounting discretion in mitigating management earnings forecast errors. By 
using an accrual expectation model (a modified version of the model employed by 
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Jones 1991), this study found that earnings management practice  influenced how 
far  management  voluntarily disclosed information about the companies. This lead  
to a conclusion that earnings management tend to affect corporate governance 
practice to operate their principle. In another side, the principle of corporate 
governance also has apurposeof protecting the investor based on agency theory. 
Leuz, Nanda, and Wyscoki (2003), Appendix 30, by using the regression Jones 
model, the results showed that earnings management is expected to decrease 
investor protection. Based on the two studies, it can be confirmed that earnings 
management as an independent variable negatively affect  theprinciple of corporate 
governance and positively influence theprinciple of corporate governance.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This study aims to provide a  map of variables  related earnings management 
as an dependent variable and an independent variable based on previous studies. 
This study utilized purposive sampling method during the 1992 – 2013 period on 
Google Scholar, followed by a review of 30 previous studies concerning earnings 
management. The used method in this study is grouping the study become two parts: 
earnings management was considered as a dependent variable and earnings 
management was considered as an independent variable. There are 20 previous 
studies were considered earnings management as an afected variable. There are 
three categories in accounting theory which is believed to associate with earnings 
management which are Positive Accounting Theory (PAT), corporate governance, 
accounting standards.Based on the discussion, when earnings management was 
considered as dependent variable, most of the previous study relating with variable 
that arises due to corporate governance. The existence of corporate governance does 
give not onlyadverse effect on earnings management but also give positive effect 
by controlling earnings management practices. 
There are 10 previous studies were considered earnings management as an 
affecting variable. There are four categories in accounting theory which is believed 
to be influenced by earnings management related to Positive Accounting Theory 
(PAT),financial activity, firm performance and corporate governance. Then when 
earnings management was considered as an independent variable, most of the 
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previous study relating variable that arise due to financial indicatormeasurement in 
firm performance.In general, this study concluded that earnings management which 
considered as a dependent variable or an independent, both of side, must be 
relationship withvariable that arisesdue tocorporate governance and Positive 
Accounting Theory (PAT). 
This study is limited to the subjectivity in choosing the sample of earnings 
management study. The future study is suggested to examine beyond one 
perspective to consider earnings management as a dependent variable or as an 
independent variable. This study contribute to improve the understanding of 
earnings management for accounting scholar.This study contribute to improve the 
understanding of earnings management for accounting scholar 
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Journal Summary 
Appendix 1 
Title Political cost incentives for earnings management in the 
cable television industry 
Author Kimberly Galligan Key 
Purpose Examines the role of accounting information in the 
political process surrounding regulation of the cable 
television (TV) industry. 
Year Published 1 April 1997 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Department of Accountancy and Business Law, University 
of North Carolina, Wilmington, Wilmington, NC 28403, 
USA 
Independent 
Variable 
Political cost incentives 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings management 
Sample Cable TV Financial Databook (Databook)  
Method Earnings management is measured using discretionary 
accruals, and data are consistent with managerial 
incentives to mitigate the effects of political scrutiny and 
potential industry reregulation 
Findings       Political costs theory states that to the extent a firm is 
subject to potential wealth transfers in the political process, 
its management is hypothesized to make accounting 
choices that reduce the transfer. The cable TV industry has 
several factors that distinguish this study from previous, 
related studies and that make this study a strong test of 
political costs theory. 
Keywords Political process; Earnings management; Accruals JEL 
classification: M4, L20 
 
Appendix 2 
Title Earnings management and nonroutine  executive changes 
Author Susan Pourciau 
Purpose Examines evidence of earnings management associated 
with nonroutine executive changes. 
Year Published March 1992  
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 16 (1993) 317-336. 
North-Holland, Florida state University  
Independent 
Variable 
Nonroutine  executive changes 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings management 
Sample 73 firms are changing top executives over the period 
1985-1988. 
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Method Total accrual measurement  
Findings       The empirical evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis that incoming executives manage accruals in a 
way that decreases earnings in the year of the executive 
change and increases earnings the following year. Further. 
incoming executives record large write-offs and special 
items the year of the management change. Contrary to 
expectation, departing executives record accruals and 
writeoffs that decrease earnings during their last year of 
tenure. Several possible reasons for this result are 
suggested. 
Keywords - 
 
Appendix 3 
Title Corporate Governance and earnings Management  
Author Sonda Marrkchi Chtourou, Jean Bedard, Lucie Courteau 
Research Purpose Examine the  the effect of best governance practices by 
boards of directors and audit committee on thepractice of 
earnings management through discretionary accruals.  
Year Published April 2001 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
University Laval, Canada 
Independent 
Variable 
Corporate Governance 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Sample Using 300 US  firms formed of  two groups of US firms, 
one relatively high and one with relatively low levels of 
discretionary accruals in 1996. 
Method Logistic regression model, Jones model 1991 
Findings        For audit committees, income increasing earnings 
management in negatively associated with a larger 
proportion of outside members who are not managers in 
another firm, a clear mandate or overseeing both the 
financial statements and the external audit, and a committee 
compose only of independent directors that meet more than 
twice a year. Also, find the short term stocks option held by 
noexecutive committee members are associated with 
income increasing earnings management.Income 
decreasing earnings management is negatively associated 
with the presence of at least a member with financial 
expertise and a clear mandate for overseeing both the 
financial statements and the external audit.  For the board 
directors, we find less income increasing earnings 
management in firms whose outside board members have 
experience as board members with the firm and with 
another firm. Also find the larger board , the importance of 
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the ownership stakes in the firm held by noexecutive 
directors, and experienced as board membersseem to reduce 
income-decreasing earnings management. 
Keywords Corporate Governance,audit committee, earnings 
Management, Discretionary accruals 
 
Appendix 4 
Title Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and 
earnings management 
Author April Klein 
Purpose Examines whether audit committee and board 
characteristics are related to earnings management by the 
firm 
Year Published 2 February 2002 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Stern School of Business, New York University, New 
York, NY 10012-1118, USA 
Independent 
Variable 
Audit committee and board of director characteristics 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings management 
Sample All firm-years listed on the S&P 500 as of March 31, 1992 
and 1993 with annual shareholder meetings between July 
1, 1991 and June 30, 1993. 
Method Jones (1991) expected accruals model 
Findings  Our findings have several implications. First, they suggest 
that the current improvement and convergence projects 
were sensible. US GAAP seem to perform better than 
preimprovement IAS when institutional factors and 
economic incentives are the same. Second, the standard 
setters may consider prolonging the option for European 20 
companies cross-listed in the US to use US GAAP for 
reporting purposes beyond 2007. Finally, third, regulators 
and markets may consider augmenting IAS 
reportingrequirements by elements taken from US GAAP. 
Keywords Earnings management; Corporate governance; Audit 
committee; Board of directors 
 
Appendix 5 
Title Accrual Management To Meet Earnings targets: UK 
Evidence Pre- and Post-Cadbury  
Author K.V. PEasnell, P.F. Pope, and  S. Young 
Purpose Tests whether the association between board composition 
and earnings management activity differs between the pre- 
and post-Cadbury periods 
Year Published  March 2000 
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Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
British Accounting Review (2000) 32, 415–445, Lancaster 
University 
Independent 
Variable 
Board Effectiveness 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Sample Using a sample of UK-incorporated quoted companies for 
a period spanning the publication of the Cadbury Report 
(1992) 
Method Aggregate Accounting Accruals model  
Findings       Results provide evidence of accrual management to 
meet earnings targets in both periods. However, while we 
find no proof of an association between the degree of 
accrual management and the composition of the board of 
directors in the pre-Cadbury period, results for the post-
Cadbury period indicate less income-increasing accrual 
management to avoid earnings losses or earnings declines 
when the proportion of non-executive directors is high. 
These results are consistent with the view that appropriately 
structured boards are discharging their financial reporting 
duties more effectively post-Cadbury. 
Keywords - 
 
Appendix 6 
Title Corporate governance and earnings management at 
large U.S. bank holding companies 
Author Marcia Millon Cornett , Jamie John McNutt , Hassan 
Tehranian 
Purpose Examines whether corporate governance mechanisms 
affect earnings and earnings management at the largest 
publicly traded bank holding companies in the United 
States 
Year Published 6 May 2009 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Bentley University, Waltham, MA 02452-4705, United 
States 
Independent 
Variable 
Corporate governance 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings management 
Sample 593 bank, the largest bank holding companies (BHCs) 
headquartered in the United States and operating 
during 1994 through 2002 period. 
Method OLS regressions 
Findings    First find that performance, earnings management, 
and corporate governance are endogenously 
determined. Thus, OLS estimation can lead to biased 
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coefficients, and a simultaneous equations approach is 
used.We find that CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity 
(PPS), board independence, and capital are positively 
related to earnings and that earnings, board 
independence, and capital are negatively related to 
earnings management. We also find that PPS is 
positively related to earnings management. Finally, PPS 
and board independence are positively related, and the 
relationship is bidirectional. While both PPS and board 
independence are associated with higher earnings, our 
results indicate that more independent boards appear 
to constrain the earnings management that greater PPS 
compels. 
Keywords Corporate governance , Earnings management , 
Financial performance , Financial institutions 
 
Appendix 7 
Title Board Characteristics and Earnings Management 
Author Bennardus Y  Nugroho  and Dumantueko 
Research Purpose Estimate the effect of board characteristics(measured based 
on the independent board of director, dual leadership/CEO 
duality,board size,managerial ownership,Board 
composition/ multiple directorships,board tenure,audit 
committee and board interlock)on earnings management  
Year Published January 2011 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Department of Administration Science, Faculty of Social 
and Political Science, Universitas Indonesia. Journal of 
administrative science & organization  
Independent 
Variable 
Board characteristics 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Sample Companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange 
during the 2004-2008 period. 
Method Uses the Jones model (1991) as modified by Dechow and 
Sloan (1996) to separate nondiscretionary accrual (NDAC) 
components from discretionary accrual components (DAC) 
in the total accrual 
Findings      Shows that earnings management takes place in 
companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange during 
the 2004-2008 period.Companies in general, manufacturers, 
non-manufacturers, and corporations use audit committee 
services. It is discovered that the independent board of 
directors, board size, managerial ownership, board 
composition/multiple directorships, board tenure, and audit 
committee do not affect earnings management practices in 
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the above companies; only dual leadership/CEO duality 
affects the earnings management practices. 
Keywords corporate governance, earnings management 
 
Appendix 8  
Title Good Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 
Practices: An Indonesian Cases 
Author Werner R. Murhadi, Dr 
Purpose Finding out the effect of Good Governance practice can 
reduce earnings management practice done by 
thecompany. 
Year Published March 23, 2009 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Faculty of Economics, Universitas Surabaya, Indonesia 
Independent 
Variable 
Good Corporate Governance 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings Management Practices 
Sample 384  companies registered in manufacture sector in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange observation period 2005-2007 
Method OLS method 
Findings     The result shows that only two variables have 
asignificant effect on Earnings Management practice which 
is CEO Duality and controlling shareholder existence. 
Other independent variables such as independent 
commissioner and audit committee and also shareholder 
coalition outside the controlling shareholder don’t have any 
effect on earnings management practice in the company. 
Control variable like coverage analyst and debt don’t have 
any effect either, to earnings management practice 
existence. 
Keywords Good Corporate Governance, Earnings Management, 
Coverage Analyst, Debt 
 
Appendix 9 
Title Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Competing 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Earnings 
Management 
Author Joseph V. Carcello, Carl W. Hollingsworth,April 
Klein,Terry L. Neal 
 
Purpose Examine the associations between audit committee 
financial expertise and alternate corporate 
governance mechanisms and earnings management. 
Year Published February 2006 
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Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
University of Tennessee 
 
Independent 
Variable 
The associations between audit committee financial 
expertise and alternate corporate governance mechanisms 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings management 
Sample 350 non-financial, domestic firms from Compact D/SEC 
with fiscal year ends on July 15, 2003, and December 31, 
2003,5 
Method Modified Jones Model 
Findings      We find that both accounting and certain types of non-
accounting financial expertise reduce earnings management 
for firms with weak alternate corporate governance 
mechanisms, but that independent audit committee 
members with financial expertise are most effective in 
mitigating earnings management. Importantly we find that 
other corporate governance mechanisms are an effective 
substitute for audit committee financial expertise in 
constraining earnings management. Finally, we find either 
no association or a positive association between financial 
skills and real earnings management. Our results suggest 
that alternative governance approaches are equally effective 
in improving the quality of financial reporting and that firms 
should have the flexibility to design the particular set of 
governance mechanisms that best fit their unique situations. 
Keywords - 
 
Appendix  10 
Title The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
on Constraining Earnings Management: Literature Review 
and Proposed Framework 
Author Ebraheem Saleem Salem Alzoubi,  Mohamad Hisyam 
Selamat 
Purpose Investigates the role of the board of directors and audit 
committee of earnings  management (EM). 
Year Published June 2012 17 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
 International Journal of Global Business, 5 (1), 17-35 
Independent 
Variable 
The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Sample  
Method - 
Findings Evidence from preceding studies suggested that the boards 
of directors of smaller companieshave more independent 
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directors.They were equipped with financial expertise and 
meet more frequently are effective in their monitoring role. 
In the same way, audit committees with more members, 
individual independence, more financial skills and that are 
more active are suggested to have a higher oversight 
function. In regard to EM, this paper views EM as 
opportunistic earnings. The present study argues that the 
firms with striking characteristics of board and audit 
committee are less likely to allow EM because 
opportunistic earning's cause uncertainty about the 
economic value of a firm. 
Keywords Board of Directors, Audit Committee, Corporate 
Governance, Earnings Management, Financial Reporting 
Quality 
Appendix 11 
Title Corporate governance and earnings management in the 
Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective 
Author Qiao Liu and  Zhou (Joe) Lu1 
Purpose Examines the relation between earnings management and 
corporate governance in China by introducing a tunneling 
perspective. 
Year Published 2 August 2007 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Hong 
Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong 
Independent 
Variable 
Corporate Governance 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Sample 5977 firm-year observations for 1999–2005, which 
represent 1009 different listed firms. 
Method Jones model 1991 
Findings Consistent with this hypothesis, the regression results show 
that earnings management is negatively associated with the 
quality of minority shareholder rights and legal 
enforcement. The findings highlight an important link 
between investor protection and the quality of accounting 
earnings reported to market participants, and complement 
both finance research that treats the quality of corporate 
reporting as exogenous and accounting research that 
documents systematic patterns in the relation between stock 
returns and accounting numbers. Our findings are robust to 
the inclusion of controls for country wealth, economic 
heterogeneity across countries, and international 
differences in accounting rules and ownership 
concentration.  
Keywords Agency problems; Earnings management; Tunneling; 
Corporate governance 
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Appendix 12 
Title Corporate Governance, Firm Size, and Earnings 
Management: Evidence in Indonesia Stock Exchange 
Author Dwi Lusi Tyasing Swastika 
Purpose Evaluate the impact of the corporate governance regulation 
implementation and firm size on the earnings management 
for food and beverages companies in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange. 
Year Published 2005 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
IOSR Journal of Business and Management (IOSR-JBM) 
e-ISSN: 2278-487X, p-ISSN: 2319-7668. Volume 10, 
Issue 4 (May. - Jun. 2013), PP 77-82 STIE 
Malangkuçeçwara, Malang 
Independent 
Variable 
Corporate Governance, Firm Size, 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Sample Using data from the year 2005 annual reports of 51 food 
and beverages listed companies,including the composite 
index 
Method The multiple regression is utilized to test this relationship 
at 95% confidence.Corporate governance was proxied by 
theboard of director, audit quality, and board 
independence. Firm size was represented by thenatural 
logarithm of total assets. Earnings management was 
measured by Jones model withdiscretionary accruals. 
Findings We empirically show that Chinese listed companies' 
earnings managementis significantly related to the main 
aspects of their corporate governance. Good corporate 
governance mitigates agency problems, especially agency 
conflicts between the largest shareholders and the minority 
shareholders, which often takes the form of tunneling in the 
Chinese context. We then study two China-specific 
situations, in which earnings management has been 
identified to be the most conspicuous. For each of them, we 
document listed firms' incentives to manage earnings and 
relate these incentives to controlling shareholders' tunneling 
activities. Specifically, we manage to estimate the size of 
private control benefits that controlling shareholders are 
able to extract, and find that they are related to listed firms' 
earnings management. Such findings explain why listed 
firms in China have strong incentives to manage earnings 
when facing a de-listing risk. We also document the mis-
allocation of raised capital by controlling shareholders in 
cases of rights issues. Although our results suggest that 
earnings management in the Chinese listed companies is  
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largely due to tunneling, they should be interpreted 
cautiously..  
Keywords Corporate governance, Firm size, Earnings Management 
 
Appendix 13 
Title Earnings Management and Corporate Governance in 
Asia’sEmerging Markets 
Author Chung-Hua Shen and Hsiang-Lin Chih 
Research Purpose To study how corporate governance affects EM of Asian 
countries by using firm-level data. 
Year Published 2007 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Journal compilation 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 
Garsington Road,Oxford, OX42DQ,UK and 350 main St, 
Malden MA, USA 
Independent 
Variable 
Corporate Governance 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Sample Use firm-level governance data, taken from Credit 
Lyonnais Security Asia (CLSA), of nine Asian 
countries, in addition to the country-level governance data 
used in past studies 
Method Regression method 
Findings      First, firms with good corporate governance tend to 
conduct fewer earnings management. Second, there is a size 
effect for earnings smoothing, that is, large size firms are 
prone to conduct earnings smoothing, but good corporate 
governance can mitigate the effect on average. Third, there 
is a turning point for leverage effect, i.e. when the 
governance index is large, leverage effect exists. 
Otherwise,reverse leverage effect exists. It shows that a 
highly leveraged firm with poor governance is prone to be 
scrutinized closely and thus finds it harder to fool the 
market by manipulating earnings. Fourth, companies with 
higher growth (lower earnings yield) are prone to engage in 
earnings smoothing and earnings aggressiveness, but good 
corporate governance can mitigate the effect. Finally, firms 
in stronger anti-director rights countries tend to exhibit 
stronger earnings smoothing. This counter-intuitive result is 
different from Leuz et al.  
Keywords Corporate governance, earnings management, investor 
protection, emerging markets 
Appendix 14  
Title Corporate governance and pay-for-performance: The 
impact of earnings management 
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Author Marcia Millon Cornetta, Alan J. Marcusb, Hassan 
Tehranian, 
Purpose Ask whether the apparent impact of governance structure 
and incentive-based compensation on firm performance 
stands up when measured performance is adjusted for the 
effects of earnings management 
Year Published 2 March 2007 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Journal of Financial Economics 87 (2008) 357–373 
aSouthern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL, 62901, 
USA 
Independent 
Variable 
Corporate governance and pay-for-performance 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings management 
Sample Firms included in the S&P 100 Index (obtained from 
Standard & Poor’s) as of the start of 1994. 
Method Discretionary accruals 
Findings Results provide evidence of accrual management to meet 
earnings targets in both the pre- and post-Cadbury periods. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these results suggest that the recent 
changes in the UK governance system have failed to 
completely eliminate earnings management activity. In 
contrast, we find no evidence of an association between the 
degree of accrual management and the proportion of non-
executive directors in the pre-Cadbury period.These results 
confirm those reported by Peasnell et al. (1999a) and 
support the view that the board’s effectiveness at 
monitoring management is a positive function of the 
proportion of non-executive members. Secondly,our results 
suggest that appropriately structured boards are discharging 
their financial reporting duties more effectively following 
the issuance of the Cadbury Report. As such, these findings 
are consistent with the view that the publication of the 
Cadbury Report has had a material impact on the way in 
which UK boards operate.  
Keywords Corporate governance; Earnings management; Financial 
performance; Stock options 
 
Appendix 15 
Title Do Accounting Standards influence the Level of Earnings 
Management? Evidence from Germany 
Author Igor Goncharov and Jochen Zimmermann 
Research Purpose Analyses whether the level of earnings management 
differs between the standards 
Year Published 2009 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Amsterdam Business school, Netherlands 
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Independent 
Variable 
Accounting Standards 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Sample German companies listed in the year 2000 in DAX 30, 
MDAX and NEMAX 50 indexes  period are years 1996 to 
2002. 
Method Modified Jones model 
Findings Evidence consistent with the hypothesis of earnings 
management is found. A careful comparison of this study 
and the DeAngelo (1986) study suggests that the principal 
difference is due to the sample, not the methods. We 
examine the financial health of the firms prior to the 
management buyout, and find no indication that the 
negative accruals are due to a pattern of declining 
performance. Partitioning the sample by debt level, level of 
institutional ownership, and exchange listing fail to indicate 
any systematic constraints on the ability of managers to 
reduce earnings in the year preceding a management 
buyout. A disaggregation of the total accruals into the 
depreciation expense component and the change in noncash 
working capital component reveals evidence of earnings 
management in both components. While a finer partition 
may be more discriminating, at this stage we conclude that 
earnings management is implemented through a composite 
strategy of accounting policy choices. Earnings 
management is of interest because it concerns the potential 
illegal or unethical transfers of wealth. Many individuals, 
including former SEC commissioner Bevis Longstreth 
(1984), have expressed deep concern about the conflict of 
interest managers face in these types of transactions.  
Keywords Earnings management, reporting incentives, international 
accounting standards. 
 
Appendix 16 
Title Do accounting standards matter? An exploratory analysis 
of earnings management before and after IFRS adoption 
Author Thomas Jeanjean, Hervé Stolowy 
Purpose Analyze the effect of the mandatory introduction of IFRS 
standards on earnings quality, and more precisely on 
earnings management. 
Year Published 2008 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
HEC Paris, 1, rue de la Libération, 78351-Jouy-en-Josas, 
France 
Independent 
Variable 
The mandatory introduction of IFRS standards 
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Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings management 
Sample We concentrate on three IFRS first-time adopter countries, 
namely Australia, France, and the UK. comprises 1146 
firms (5051 firm-year observations): 422 (1933) for 
Australia, 321 (1316) for France and 403 (1802) for the 
UK. 
Method Statistical properties of earnings to identify thresholds 
Findings     Find that the pervasiveness of earnings management did 
not decline after the introduction of IFRS, and in fact 
increased in France. Our results confirm that sharing rules 
is not a sufficient condition to create a common business 
language and that management incentives and national 
institutional factors play a major role in framing financial 
reporting characteristics. We suggest that the IASB, the 
SEC and the European Commission should now devote 
their efforts to harmonizing incentives and institutional 
factors rather than harmonizing accounting standards. 
keywords IFRS, Earnings management, Thresholds 
 
Appendix 17 
Title The Effect of IFRS and its Enforcement on Earnings 
Management An International Company 
Author Lei Cai, Asheq Rahman, Stephen Courtenay 
Purpose Examine the effect of IFRS adoption and its enforcement 
on earnings management 
Year Published December 2008 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
School of Accountancy , Massey University ,New Zealand 
Independent 
Variable 
IFRS Enforcement 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Sample Over 100,000 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2006 
across 32 countries 
Method Using a modified measure of enforcement developed by 
Hope (2003). Use Autoregressions on time-series data for 
the cross-country comparison 
Findings 
 
Earnings management in IFRS adoption countries has been 
decreasing in recent years and showed that countries with 
stronger enforcement generally have fewer earnings 
management. 
Keywords - 
 
Appendix 18 
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Title Detecting Earnings Management 
Author Patricia M. Dechow Richard G. Sloan , Amy P Sweeney 
Purpose Evaluates alternative accrual-based models for detecting 
earnings management 
Year Published April 1995 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
The accounting Review Vol. 70, No. 2 
Independent 
Variable 
Models  for detecting earnings management 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Sample Compustat industrial files with the necessary data between 
1950 and 1991. The 1000 firm-years are selected in a 
sequential fashion and without replacement. A firm-year is 
Method Discretionary accruals 
Findings       First, all of the models appear well specified when 
applied to a random sample of firm-years. Second, the 
models all generate tests of low power for earnings 
management of economically plausible magnitudes (e.g., 
one to five percent of total assets). Third, all models reject 
the null hypothesis of no earnings management at rates 
exceeding the specified testlevels when applied to samples 
of firms with extreme financial performance. This result 
highlights the importance of controlling for financial 
performance when investigating earnings management 
stimuli that are correlated with financial performance. 
Finally, a modified version of the model developed by 
Jones (1991) exhibits the most power in detecting earnings 
management. 
Keywords Earnings management, Discretionary accruals, Models 
selection, SEC. 
 
Appendix 19 
Title Research design issues in earnings management studies 
Author Maureen F. McNichols 
Purpose discusses trade-o€s associated with three research designs 
commonly used in the earnings management literature: 
those based on aggregate accruals, those based on 
special®c accruals and those based on the distribution of 
earnings after management 
Year Published 2000 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Department of Accounting, Graduate School of Business, 
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA 
Independent 
Variable 
Research design issues 
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Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Sample Descriptive data on journal articles on earnings 
management 
Method Comparing the research design on earnings management 
Findings      Empirical findings suggest that aggregate accruals 
models that do not consider long-term earnings growth are 
potentially misspecified and can result in misleading 
inferences about earnings management behavior. It is 
suggested that future progress in the earnings management 
literature is more likely to come from theapplication of 
appropriate®c accrual and distribution-based tests than 
from aggregate accruals tests. 
Keywords - 
 
Appendix 20  
Title Earnings management and the underperformance of 
seasoned equity offerings 
Author Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch, T.J. Wong 
Purpose Examine whether unusually aggressive management of 
earnings through income-increasing accounting 
adjustments leads investors to be overly optimistic about 
the issuerÕs prospects. 
Year Published 26 June 1997 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Journal of Financial Economics 50 (1998) 63Ð99 . 
University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor, MI 
48109, USA 
Independent 
Variable 
The underperformance of seasoned equity offerings 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings management 
Sample 1265 report for seasoned equity issues between January 
1970 and September 1989 from the Securities Data 
Corporation. 
Method Discretionary accruals  
Findings      We find that issuers who adjust current discretionary 
accruals to report higher net income prior to the o¤ering 
have lower post-issue long-run abnormal stock returns and 
net income. Interestingly, the relation between current 
discretionary accruals and future returns (adjusted for Þrm 
size and book-to-market ratio) is stronger and more 
persistent for seasoned equity issuers than for non-issuers. 
The evidence is consistent with investors naively 
extrapolating pre-issue earnings without fully adjusting for 
the potential manipulation of reported earnings. 
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Keywords Corporate Þnance; Seasoned equity o¤erings; Earnings 
management; Accounting accruals; Anomalies; Market 
efficiency 
 
Appendix 21 
Title CEO incentives and earnings management 
Author Daniel Bergstresser , Thomas Philippon 
Purpose Examine cross-sectional data from the 1990s to assess 
whether the increasing use of accruals is related to the 
increase in stock-based CEO compensation. 
Year Published 22 December 2005 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Harvard Business School, Boston MA 02163,USA 
Independent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Dependent 
Variable 
CEO incentives 
Sample Accruals, CEO incentives, and CEO option exercises and 
share sales 
Method Modified Jones model 
Findings     Provide evidence that the use of discretionary accruals to 
manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced at firms 
where the CEO’s potential total compensation is more 
closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings. In 
addition, during years of high accruals, CEOs exercise 
scores of choices and CEOs unusually, and other insiders 
sell large quantities of shares. 
Keywords Earnings management,  Stock options, CEO compensation 
 
 
Appendix 22 
Title Earnings management preceding management buyout 
offers 
Author Susan E. Perrya, Thomas H. Williams 
Purpose Examine the financial health of the firms prior to the 
management buyout, 
Year Published March 1994 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
School of Commerce. University of Virginia, 
Charlottesville, VA 22903-2493, USA bSchool of 
Business, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706, 
USA. Journal ofAccounting and Economies 18 
Independent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Dependent 
Variable 
Management buyout offers 
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Sample 175 management buyouts during 1981-88  
Method aggregate accruals model 
Findings Evidence from preceding studies suggested that the boards of 
directors who are smaller in size, have more independent 
directors, are equipped with financial expertise and meet more 
frequently are effective in their monitoring role. In the same 
way, audit committees with more members, sole 
independence, more financial expertise and that are more 
active are suggested to have a higher oversight function. In 
regard to EM, this paper views EM as opportunistic earnings. 
This study argues that the firms with effective characteristics 
of board and audit committee are less likely to allow EM 
because opportunistic earning's cause uncertainty about the 
economic value of a firmThe initial study on the conceptual 
framework, which is to examine the link between corporate 
practices and the FRQ, has led to further studies on the two 
mechanisms of corporate practices, which are known to be 
important attributes to the FRQ.  
Keywords Contracting; Earnings management; Accruals; 
Management buyouts 
 
Appendix 23 
Title Earnings Management and Dividend Policy: Empirical 
evidence from Pakistani listed companies 
Author Jahanzaib Haider 
Purpose Find out the impact of earnings management on dividend 
policy in Pakistan 
Year Published 2012 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Bahaudin Zakariya University, Multan Sub-Campus, Dera 
Ghazi Khan, Pakistan 
Independent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Dependent 
Variable 
Dividend Policy 
Sample A set of listed companies from Karachi stock exchange 
(KSE) 100 indexes have been investigated to analyze the 
relationship from the year 2005 to 2009 in Pakistan 
Method Modified cross-sectional model (1995) has been used to 
measure discretionary accruals 
Findings       Regression analysis shows that earnings management 
has animpact on dividend policy that rejects our null 
hypothesis. But coefficient indicates that the relationship is 
so weak that is near to no connection. The reason behind 
this no impact is economic decline period because earnings 
management changes every year. In the decline period, our 
earnings management was increase, and the companies 
starts downsizing divided payment 
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Keywords Dividend Policy, Earnings Management, Karachi Stock 
Exchange 
 
Appendix 24 
Title Accrual-based and real earnings management activities 
around seasoned equity offerings  
Author Daniel A.Cohen , PaulZarowin   
Purpose we examine both real and accrual-based earnings 
management activities around seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs). 
Year Published 2 February 2010 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
New York University, Stern School of Business, NY 
10012-1118, USA 
Independent 
Variable 
Accrual-based and real earnings management activities 
Dependent 
Variable 
Seasoned equity offerings 
Sample  Consists of 1511 completed US offers over the 1987 to 
2006 period and is obtained from thecSecurities Data 
Company (SDC) New Issue database. 
Method Jones (1991) model 
Findings     Shows that post-SEO operating underperformance is 
driven not just by accrual reversals, but also reflects the real 
consequences of operational decisions made to manage 
earnings. We also show how firms’ choices of real versus 
accrual-based earnings management activities around SEOs 
vary predictably as a function of the company’s ability to 
use accrual management and the costs of doing so. 
Keywords Seasoned equity offerings Earnings management 
Accounting choices Accounting Accruals Real activities  
 
Appendix 25 
Title Earnings management through real activities manipulation 
Author Sugata Roychowdhury 
Purpose To develop empirical methods to detect real activities 
manipulation 
Year Published 2006 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA 
Independent 
Variable 
Earnings management 
Dependent 
Variable 
Real activities manipulation 
Sample All firms in COMPUSTAT between 1987 and 2001 
Method Cross-sectional regression 
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Findings       Find evidence consistent with managers manipulating 
real activities to avoid reporting annual losses. Specifically, 
I find evidence suggesting price discounts to temporarily 
increase sales, overproduction to report the9lower cost of 
goods sold, and reduction of discretionary expe94ditures to 
improve reported margins. The cross-sectional analysis 
reveals that these activities are less prevalent in the 
presence of sophisticated investors. Other factors that 
influence real activities manipulation include industry 
membership, the stock of inventories and receivables, and 
incentives to meet zero earnings. There is also some, though 
less robust, evidence of real activities manipulation to meet 
annual analyst forecasts.  
Keywords Capital markets; Accounting choice; Earnings 
manipulation 
 
Appendix 26 
Title Earnings Management, Firm Performance, and the Value 
of Indian Manufacturing Firms 
Author Amarjit Gill, Nahum Biger, Harvinder S. Mand, Neil 
Mathur 
Research Purpose To test whether the practice of earnings management that 
affects and perhaps benefits management of Indian 
companies has an effect on a firms’ performance and 
whether earnings management has an effect on other 
stakeholders 
Year Published November 2013 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics. 
ISSN 1450-2887 Issue 116  
Independent 
Variable 
Earnings Management  
Dependent 
Variable 
Return on Assets (Firm Performance) 
Sample 250 firms were selected from Top 500 Companies listed 
on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) for a period of 4 
years (from 2009-2012). 
Method co-relational research design (the weighted least square 
regression model with a cross section weight of 
three industries which are consumer products 
manufacturing, industrials products manufacturing, and 
energy 
production was used) 
Findings    The results of this study indicate that the more intense the 
practice of earnings management, the greater it’s adverse 
effect on thecorporate rate of return on assets in the 
following year. The study also found that to some extent, 
the market realizes that management acts with selfish 
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motives and response by lowering share prices and 
corporate market value. 
Keywords Earnings management, Firm performance, Market value of 
the firm, Shareholders’ wealth. 
 
Appendix 27  
Title What Are the Consequences of Real Earnings 
Management? 
Author Katherine Gunny 
Purpose Examines the consequences of four types of real earnings 
management 
Year Published January 2005 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Haas School of Business University of California, 
Berkeley CA 94720 
Independent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Dependent 
Variable 
Future operating performance  
Sample 32,402 firm-year observations with required financial 
statement variables and returns data COMPUSTAT 
industrial, full-coverage and research files and stock 
returns and size portfolio returns from 1988 to 2000. 
CRSP. 
Method Discretionary accruals 
Findings       The empirical results are consistent with all four types 
of real earnings management activities having a 
significantly negative impact on future operating 
performance. Additionally, it appears that investors 
recognize the future earnings implications of myopic 
investment in SG&A and cutting prices and/or 
overproducing to increase current period income. The 
results are inconsistent with investors recognizing the 
future earnings consequences of amyopic investment in 
R&D and the strategic timing of asset sales. The results are 
consistent with analysts recognizing the future earnings 
implications of all four types of real earnings management. 
Keywords - 
 
Appendix 28 
Title Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and 
losses 
Author David Burgstahler , Ilia Dichev  
Purpose Provide extensive systematic evidence about whether, 
how, and why, firms avoid reporting earnings decreases 
and losses 
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Year Published April 1997 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
School o/Business, Box 353200, Universi O' of 
Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195-3200, USA 
Independent 
Variable 
Earnings management 
Dependent 
Variable 
Earnings decreases and losses 
Sample Equal-sized portfolios of 1,000 observations per portfolio 
Method  
Findings  We find that firms’ choices vary predictably as a function 
of the firm’s ability to use accrual management and the 
costs of doing so. Our model is a first step in examining 
how firms tradeoff between real versus accrual methods of 
earnings management. Third, and most important, we 
examine the effect of each type of earnings management 
strategy on the firm’s post-SEO operating performance. 
Our evidence implies that the decline in post-SEO 
operating performance attributable to real activities 
management is more severe than that attributable to 
accruals management. This indicates that the post-SEO 
operating performance decline is driven not just by accrual 
reversals, as suggested by prior research (Rangan, 1998; 
Teoh et al., 1998), but also reflects the real consequences of 
operational decisions made to manage earnings at the time 
of the SEO. Overall, our findings show the importance of 
real earnings management activities around a specific 
corporate finance event, SEOs.  
Keywords Earnings management, Earnings decreases, Losses 
 
Appendix 29  
Title On the Association Between Voluntary Disclosure and 
Earnings Management  
Author Ron Kazmir 
Purpose Investigate the extent to which voluntary disclosure and 
earnings forecast related. 
Year Published August 1996 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Business Stanford University. Standford CA9435 
Independent 
Variable 
Earnings Management 
Dependent 
Variable 
 Voluntary Disclosure 
Sample The sample consists of earnings forecasts, attributed to 
either the firm or one of its officers, that appear on the 
Nexist News (Wires) filesometime during the period 1987-
1991 
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Method Using model modifies by jones (1991)  
Findings      The empirical results are consistent with the prediction 
that managers, fearing costly legal actions by shareholders 
and loss of reputation for credibility, use discretionary 
accruals to reduce their forecasting errors.Specifically, the 
paper documents that managers who overestimate the 
earnings number manage reported earnings upward and that 
the extent of discretionary accruals is associated with 
various securities litigation costs factors and the number of 
management's accounting flexibility. The study raises the 
possibility that the degree of accounting discretion affects 
corporate voluntary disclosure policies.  
Keywords - 
 
Appendix 30 
Title Earnings management and investor protection: an 
international comparison 
Author Christian Leuz,  Dhananjay Nanda, and Peter D. Wysocki 
Purpose Examines systematic differences in earnings management 
across 31 countries. We propose an explanation for these 
differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt 
to protect their private control benefits, use earnings 
management to conceal solid performance from outsiders. 
Year Published 21 March 2003 
Sourced/Origin 
(Country) 
Journal of Financial Economics 69 (2003) 505–527 
Independent 
Variable 
Earnings management 
Dependent 
Variable 
Investor protection 
Sample the sample consists of 70,955 firm-year observations, 
across 31 countries and 8,616 non-financial firms for the 
fiscal years 1990 to 1999 
Method Using cluster analysis 
Findings       Findings are consistent with this prediction and suggest 
an endogenous link between corporate governance and the 
quality of reported earnings. Thus, earnings management is 
expected to decrease in investor protection because of 
strong protection limits insiders’ ability to acquire private 
control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask 
firm performance. 
Keywords Corporate governance; Earnings management; Investor 
protection; Law; Private control benefits 
 
 
